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Abstract
Purpose: To examine the outcomes of a substantial broad-based employee  share-ownership  scheme
for employee attitudes and behaviour in a privatised firm.
Methodology:   Results   are   based   on   a   survey   of   711   employees    in    Eircom,    an    Irish
telecommunications firm, which is 35 percent employee-owned.
Findings: The ESOP has created sizable financial returns and  has  had  extensive  influence  in  firm
governance at the  strategic  level.   However,  findings  show  only  a  limited  impact  on  employee
attitudes and behaviour.  This is attributed to a failure in creating a sense  of  employee  participation
and line of sight between employee performance and reward.
Originality: Little research has examined the impact of a large  employee  shareholding  on  attitudes
and behaviour within a public-quoted firm.   The  substantial  and  unparalleled  size  of  the  Eircom
ESOP presented a unique opportunity to conduct such a study.
Policy  implications:  The  aim  of  employee  share-ownership  often   includes   aligning   employee
objectives with those of other shareholders, and thus improving labour performance.  The findings in
this study highlight a need to provide employees with a sense  of  ownership  and  control.   Findings
also question the assumption that where employees have a substantial shareholding,  they  will  focus
on securing the long-term prospects of the firm.
Keywords:  employee  share-ownership;  employee  attitudes  and  behaviour,   employee   participation,
privatisation
Category: research paper
Introduction
In  recent  years  there  has  been  substantial  growth  in  the  number  of  employee  share-
ownership schemes throughout Europe, with the number of schemes expected to  double  over  the
next  five  to  ten  years  (Mathieu,  2007).   Many  countries  have  incorporated  employee  share-
ownership as part of their privatisation programmes, with the aim of creating closer  management-
employee relations, improving employee performance,  and  reducing  opposition  to  firm  reform
(Gianaris, 1996).   However,  the  long-term  success  of  employee  share-ownership  in  terms  of
performance is dependent on subsequent changes in employee attitudes and  behaviour  (Freeman,
2007; Kalmi et al., 2005). Research in the  US  indicates  that  in  closely  held  firms  (e.g.  family
businesses), employee share-ownership is consistently associated with increased firm performance
(Rosen, 2007).  However, few studies have examined the impact on performance in large publicly-
quoted firms, and those studies that have  been  conducted  provide  inconsistent  findings.   Rosen
(2007) suggests that these inconsistent findings are due to the initial rationale for establishing such
schemes and relatively  small  percentage  of  firm  stock  (often  less  than  5  percent)  owned  by
employees.
D’Art and Turner (2006) estimate that in 2005  there  was  approximately  400  operational
employee share-ownership schemes in Ireland.  Although growth in the number of schemes in  the
private sector has been modest, it has played a significant role in Irish public-sector reform.
The establishment of the Eircom ESOP in 1998 was a significant development  in  the  use
of share-ownership in Irish public-sector reform.  This ESOP, which secured employees an  initial
14.9 percent shareholding, was used to facilitate employee  and  trade  union  cooperation  in  firm
restructuring and privatisation.  Given its significant shareholding, the Eircom ESOP  has  been  in
position  to  significantly  influence  strategic  decision-making  within  the  firm,   and   to   create
substantial financial returns for its participants.   Based  on  a  survey  of  Eircom  employees,  this
paper  examines  if  the  ESOP  has  brought  about  an  improvement  in  employee  attitudes  and
behaviour.  It can be argued that such a substantial ESOP ought to create a real sense of  employee
ownership, thereby improving employee attitudes and behaviour (Pendleton et al., 1995).
The Eircom ESOP
Eircom (formerly Telecom Éireann) was established in 1984  as  a  state-owned  monopoly
provider of telecommunication services in Ireland.  In the mid-1990s, the firm faced a  number  of
challenges arising from market liberalisation and rapid  technological  development.   As  a  result,
the firm introduced changes in  management,  restructured  operations  around  five  market-based
business units, and entered a strategic alliance[2].
In 1997 the firm’s new management team negotiated  an  agreement  with  trade  unions  to
reduce operating costs  and  reform  work  practices  (Telecom-Éireann,  1997).   In  exchange  for
agreeing to these measures, employees received a cost-free five percent shareholding  through  the
Eircom  ESOP.   The  agreement  also  allowed  the  ESOP  to  purchase   a   further   9.9   percent
shareholding at a discounted price when the government floated the remainder of its  shareholding
on the stock exchange in July 1999.  The ESOP raised the required capital  (€241  million)  through
firm contributions and a loan that was repaid through a profit-sharing scheme.
The structure of the Eircom  ESOP  centres  on  a  limited  liability  trust,  whose  board  of
directors is dominated by nominees from the firm’s trade unions.  The trust  retains  and  exercises
ownership rights over the ESOP’s shareholding on behalf of its  participants,  and  also  nominates
representatives to Eircom’s board of directors (initially two directors).  Under tax legislation, once
the shares have been retained for a period of three years, it is at the discretion of the trust  to  make
annual tax-free distributions of up to €12,700 to each participant.
The ESOP has  played  a  significant  role  in  the  governance  of  Eircom,  particularly  in
relation  to  changes  in  firm  ownership.   In  2001,  competing  takeover  bids  for  Eircom   were
launched by two Irish consortiums,  Valentia  Telecommunications  and  e-Island.   Its  substantial
shareholding gave the ESOP a decisive influence over which  bid  would  succeed,  and  following
intense negotiations the ESOP decided to support the bid of Valentia.  In return for supporting  the
takeover and a subsequent refinancing package for the firm, the ESOP was allowed to increase  its
shareholding  to  nearly  30  percent  and  number  of  board-level  representatives   to   three.    As
highlighted by a prominent trade-unionist and ESOP director:
“The role played by the unions and the ESOP in the takeover  of  Eircom  was  unquantifiable.
Was there ever a bunch of workers in the world had such  influence  over  who  was  going  to
own their company?”
(Hastings, 2003, p.6)
Eircom was refloated on the stock exchange  in  2004.   However,  in  2006  the  firm  was  again
taken over by an Australian investment  firm,  Babcock  and  Brown.  The  ESOP  again  played  a
decisive role in this takeover, and thereby increased its shareholding to 35 percent and retained  its
three board-level representatives.
Alongside the  ESOP,  other  changes  in  firm  governance  were  introduced  to  increased
employee  participation.   Most  significantly,  a  formal   partnership   structure   was   established
between firm management and trade unions to help implement the reforms that would  accompany
privatisation (Telecom-Éireann, 1997).  The development of such structures reflected  the  broader
emphasis on workplace partnership in  the  social  partnership  agreements  negotiated  at  national
level.  Workplace partnership became a declared objective of the  Irish  government,  trade  unions
and employers organisations in the Partnership 2000 Agreement (Nesc, 1996: 39-43;  O’Donovan,
1999: 108-22).  However, the benefits of workplace partnership for employees is a contested issue
(Stuart and Lucio, 2005).  Advocates stress the possibility of ‘mutual  gains’  for  the  stakeholders
in the organisation by facilitating increased employee involvement in a climate of cooperation and
trust (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Kochan and Osterman, 1994).  Alternatively, critics  emphases  the
possibility that unions will be weakened and employees subject to greater  surveillance  and  work
intensification (Kelly, 2001; Taylor and Ramsay, 1998).  In practice the  processes  and  outcomes
of workplace partnership are influenced by a complex  set  of  factors  such  as  the  motivation  of
unions and management to engage in a partnership process, the extant  organisational  culture  and
the prevailing economic environment (Lucio and Stewart, 2004).   With  its  substantial  employee
share-ownership,  the  Eircom  ESOP  can  plausibly  be  expected  to  create  a  greater   sense   of
participation among employees and reinforced the partnership process.
Impact of share-ownership on employee attitudes and behaviour
To probe this issue further in the context of the Eircom ESOP we adopt the model of Klein
(1987).  In general, studies on the impact of employee share-ownership schemes lend little support
to claims that they can have a direct positive impact on employee attitudes and behaviour,  or  that
they directly encourage employees  to  identify  more  closely  with  the  company  (Saunders  and
Harris, 1994).   Similar  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  studies  of  employee  share-ownership
schemes that are introduced in the context of privatisation (see for example  O’Connell  Davidson,
1993; Saunders and Harris, 1994; Smith, 2009).  The broad thrust of these findings was  described
by Smith (2009).  In his study of the process of culture change within  Durham  National  Savings,
before and after the introduction of a public-private partnership, he reports:
“The majority of workers interviewed simply saw this as a  detached  financial  bonus,  and  it
did not result in them feeling any sense of affinity to the  company.   Indeed,  some  sold  their
shares as soon as the three year ‘no sell’ clause had expired”
(Smith, 2009: p.20)
Klein (1987) identifies three possible routes  through  which  share-ownership  impacts  on
employee attitudes and behaviour (see figure 1).  First, the intrinsic route is based on  the  premise
that share-ownership alone is sufficient to influence employee attitudes and  behaviour.  However,
in her own study of 37 US firms  with  ESOPs,  Klein  (1987)  found  little  empirical  evidence  to
support the intrinsic model.  A number of other studies also  indicate  that  share-ownership  has  a
greater effect on attitudes and behaviour when employees feel it brings greater financial returns or
a greater sense of control over workplace decision-making (see for example Freeman et al.,  2004;
Gittell et al., 2004; Kruse et al., 2004; Pendleton et  al.,  2001).   These  findings  lend  support  to
Klein’s further two possible routes.
Figure 1: Causal model
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The second route, the  instrumental  route,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  research,  and
proposes an indirect relationship that results from the shareholding creating a sense  of  ownership
and  participation  in  firm   decision-making   among   employees   (Ben-Ner   and   Jones,   1995;
Pendleton et al., 1998).  Creating a sense of ownership it is argued has  the  potential  to  align  the
objectives   of   employees   and   other   shareholders,   giving   employees   a   greater   sense   of
belongingness and thereby increasing their commitment  to  the  firm  (Long,  1980).   To  achieve
this, it is important that management recognise employees as firm owners and  adopt  a  culture  of
shared information and participation in decision-making at all levels within the firm (Blasi  et  al.,
2003; Gianaris, 1996; Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006).  This can involve  management  drawing
more fully on  employee  knowledge  and  expertise,  thereby  allowing  employees  to  view  their
individual contribution as important in the context of firm performance (Blasi et al., 2004; Sesil et
al.,  2002).   Extant  empirical  research  highlights  the  potential  for  employee   participation   in
decision-making, particularly at the workplace-level, to enhance performance.  However, research
also indicates many share-ownership schemes fail to create a greater  sense  of  ownership  among
employees  (see  for  example  Freeman  et  al.,  2004;  Gittell  et  al.,  2004;  Kruse  et  al.,  2004;
Pendleton et al., 1998; Rooney, 1988).  In such cases,  share-ownership  has  been  found  to  have
little impact on employee attitudes and behaviour.
Finally, the  extrinsic  route  also  posits  an  indirect  relationship  resulting  from  whether
employees perceive a clear line of sight between their work-effort and  the  financial  returns  they
receive from the share-ownership scheme. Employees can  be  substantial  beneficiaries  of  share-
ownership schemes, often receiving their initial  shareholding  at  a  discounted  price,  along  with
financial returns that qualify  under  tax  incentives.   However,  the  free-rider  problem  and  risk-
averse nature of employees can limit the ability of share-ownership in providing  effective  group-
based financial incentives (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Blasi et al., 1996; Conte  and  Kruse,  1991).
Effective incentives assume managers can  freely  observe  individual  employee  effort,  which  is
often not possible given the existence of team structures and  subsequent  information  asymmetry
(Alchian  and  Demsetz,  1973).   Furthermore,  while  employees  invest  a   great   deal   of   non-
diversifiable human-capital in the firm, variations in share value are affected by issues  other  than
employee effort (Beatty  and  Zajac,  1994;  Grossman  and  Hart,  1980;  Hart,  1983).   For  these
reasons employees may be unwilling to allow a large  proportion  of  their  income  to  depend  on
performance related measures, and have difficulties in identifying a direct link between their work-
effort and financial returns (Jensen  and  Murphy,  1990;  Rosen,  2007).   Nevertheless,  empirical
research  on  the  extrinsic  view  indicates  that  the  financial  return   generated   through   share-
ownership has a positive relationship with employee performance, although this relationship is not
strong (Buchko, 1993).  This would indicate that risk-aversion and the free-rider  problem  do  not
negate the impact of financial returns on employee attitudes  and  behaviour.   The  perceived  risk
employees associate with share-ownership  may  be  reduced  by  the  fact  returns  often  come  in
addition to existing wages and not as a  substitute  (Freeman,  2007).   Furthermore,  the  free-rider
problem may be countered by the establishment of a more cooperative culture in which employees
exert greater peer pressure and monitor their co-workers’ behaviour (Blasi et al., 2004).
Together, the instrumental and extrinsic routes propose that to realise the  full  potential  of
employee share-ownership, it is necessary for two criteria to  be  met.   First,  employees  must  be
given  a  substantial  financial  return,  which  each  feels  is  directly  related  to   their   individual
performance.  Second, employee share-ownership should  be  implemented  as  part  of  a  strategy
aimed  at  promoting  a  firm   culture   of   employee   participation   and   employee-management
cooperation. Indeed where employees report little improvement in their ability to participate,  they
may  experience  a  sense  of  disappointed  expectations  that  can  have  negative   outcomes   for
employee attitudes and behaviour (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).
Research methods
This paper examines the impact of a substantial broad-based ESOP on  employee  attitudes
and behaviour.  Based on the causal model  suggested  above,  it  also  examines  the  mechanisms
(instrumental  and  extrinsic   routes)   through   which   employee   share-ownership   impacts   on
employee attitudes and behaviour.
The data used is based on a survey of Eircom employees conducted in February 2007,  just
over 9 years after the establishment of the ESOP.  The survey  used  closed  format  questions  and
was  conducted  online  with  the   support   of   both   firm   management   and   trade   unions.   A
representative sample of 1,000 employees was surveyed and the  response  rate  was  just  over  70
percent  (n  =  711).   A  stratified  sampling   approach   was   adopted,   dividing   employees   by
geographical region and business area.   Specifically,  the  survey  sought  data  in  relation  to  the
following variables:
Changes in employee participation in decision-making: a nine item measure  using  a  seven-point
scale.   Four  items  related  to  the  operational  level  (OpPart),  while  five  items  related  to   the
departmental and strategic-level (StratPart) (see table 1).
Changes in employee attitudes: a measure using six statements and a seven-point Likert scale  (see
table 3).
Changes in employee citizenship behaviour: a measure using three  statements  and  a  seven-point
Likert scale (see table 3).
ESOP  membership:  a  dichotomous  dummy  variable  used  to  establish  membership   or   non-
membership.
Control variables: gender and occupational group (Retail/Other).
The data was analysed using OLS regression and Appendix 1 shows  descriptive  statistics,
reliability measures, and a correlation matrix for each variable.   The  reliability  of  each  measure
was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha (?), with all measures having values above 0.7.
Employee participation in firm decision-making
While the ESOP has played a crucial role in Eircom’s strategic decision-making  processes
(see section 2), it may also have acted to create a greater sense of participation  among  employees
and reinforced the partnership process.  In our  survey,  a  majority  of  employees  report  either  a
decrease or an unchanged level of participation since the introduction of the ESOP (table 1).
With  regard  to  operational  issues,  16  percent  of  respondents  reported  an  increase  in
employee participation, while 53 percent reported deterioration in employee participation.  At  the
strategic-level (here the ESOP could be  expected  to  have  its  greatest  influence)  63  percent  of
employees reported a decrease in their  level  of  participation  and  only  14  percent  indicated  an
improvement in employee participation.
Table 1: Changes in employee participation (percentages)
|                                                     |More say  |Neither  |Less say   |
|                                                     |(1-3)     |(4)      |(5-7)      |
|Operational level                                    |          |         |           |
|Manner in which they do their work                   |20        |34       |46         |
|Hours they work                                      |15        |35       |50         |
|Pay/benefits they receive                            |18        |23       |59         |
|Level of training they receive                       |12        |30       |58         |
|Mean percentage 4 items                              |16        |31       |53         |
|Departmental/strategic level                         |          |         |           |
|Hiring/dismissal of personnel                        |8         |27       |65         |
|Promotions/transfers of personnel                    |8         |26       |66         |
|Firm closures/mergers/takeovers                      |19        |23       |58         |
|Position/salary of senior Mgt                        |18        |18       |64         |
|Firm budget/finances                                 |18        |22       |60         |
|Mean percentage 5 items                              |14        |23       |63         |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (much more say) to 7 (much less say)
It appears that  the  establishment  of  the  ESOP  has  not  translated  into  a  perception  of
increased participation in decision-making among employees.  Indeed, many  employees  reported
a significant decrease in their level  of  participation.   This  may  reflect  a  sense  of  disappointed
expectations among employees. These results provide little  support  for  the  assumption  that  the
ESOP would strengthened the partnership process for employees in Eircom.
Employee financial returns
To date the ESOP has made 12 financial distributions to its participants (table 2).  The first
distribution occurred following the takeover of Eircom by Valentia.  In this distribution,  each  full
participant [2]  received  7,270  Vodafone  ordinary  shares  [3].   While  under  the  ownership  of
Valentia, Eircom was not quoted on the stock market and participants could not  realise  the  value
on ordinary shares.  Therefore, in the subsequent two distributions  redeemable  preference  shares
were used.  Following the return of Eircom to the stock  market  in  2004,  two  distributions  were
held in which for the first time participant were given an opportunity to  receive  Eircom  ordinary
shares.  Following the takeover by Babcock and Brown in 2006, the six most  recent  distributions
again relied on the use of redeemable  preference  shares.   These  most  recent  distributions  have
significantly reduced the trust’s holdings of preference shares, but have allowed it to  maintain  its
35 percent ordinary share holding in the firm.
Table 2 ESOP distributions made to date
|Date       |Type of shares                        |No. of shares* |Cash value (€)     |
|May 2002   |Vodafone ordinary shares              |7,270          |11,904             |
|Dec 2003   |Redeemable preference shares          |6,872          |6,872              |
|           |(Valentia)                            |               |                   |
|April 2004 |Redeemable preference shares          |6,872          |6,872              |
|           |(Valentia)                            |               |                   |
|Dec 2004   |Eircom ordinary shares                |3,307          |5,556†             |
|Mar 2005   |Eircom ordinary shares                |3,307          |6,614†             |
|Dec 2005   |Vodafone ordinary shares              |2,688          |4,781              |
|Nov 2006   |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |13,701         |8,073              |
|June 2007  |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |13,714         |8,080              |
|Nov 2007   |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |4,619          |4,619              |
|June 2008  |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |13,748         |7,022              |
|Nov 2008   |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |5,065          |5,065              |
|June 2009  |Redeemable preference shares (B&B)    |3,916          |2,000              |
|Total                                            |-              |77,458             |
Source: www.esop.Eircom.ie
*figures represent distributions per full participant, after giving one year’s continuous service prior to the establishment of the ESOP
† Value based on share price on day of distribution
Overall between 2002 and 2009 employees who are full participants of the ESOP  received
benefits to  the  nominal  value  of  approximately  €77,458.   Moreover,  despite  paying  out  these
substantial benefits to participants, the ESOP still retains a 35 percent shareholding in the firm.
The role of the ESOP in determining employee attitude and behaviour
Employee share-ownership can be  expected  to  align  the  objectives  of  employees  with
those of the firm and its management, and thus stimulate greater  employee  performance.   As  the
causal model suggested, this can be brought about through creating a greater since of participation
in firm decision-making and/or a direct line of sight between employee effort and financial returns
(figure 1).  It is evident that the Eircom ESOP has been  associated  with  significant  outcomes  in
terms  of  both  employee  participation  and  financial  returns.   Using  the  employee  survey  we
examine whether these have significantly  altered  employee  attitudes  and  behaviour.   It  should
however be  noted  that  the  introduction  of  the  Eircom  ESOP  occurred  as  part  of  the  firm’s
commercialisation and privatisation, and therefore observed  changes  in  attitudes  and  behaviour
could be influenced by extraneous variables.
Table 3 Changes in employee attitude and behaviour
|Items                                                     |Agree   |Neither |Disagree|
|                                                          |(1-3)   |(4)     |        |
|                                                          |%       |%       |(5-7)   |
|                                                          |        |        |%       |
|Attitude towards management and the firm                  |        |        |        |
|Since the establishment of the ESOP, employees feel…      |        |        |        |
|…a stronger sense of identification with managerial       |33      |24      |43      |
|objectives                                                |44      |28      |29      |
|…less loyalty to the management of Eircom*                |46      |24      |30      |
|…that direct relations with management is best for        |44      |17      |39      |
|protecting their interests                                |27      |19      |54      |
|…their welfare and that of Eircom are more closely linked |23      |23      |54      |
|…they are more important members of Eircom                |41      |23      |36      |
|…less loyalty/commitment to Eircom*                       |        |        |        |
|Mean percentage 6 items                                   |        |        |        |
|Employee behaviour                                        |        |        |        |
|Since the ESOP, employees…                                |        |        |        |
|…are more willing to put greater effort into their work   |45      |24      |31      |
|…are less willing to go beyond their assigned duties to   |64      |16      |20      |
|help co-workers*                                          |45      |24      |31      |
|…feel more productive in their work than they used to b   |52      |21      |27      |
|Mean percentage 3 items                                   |        |        |        |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
*Item scores have been reversed
Two sets  of  items  are  used  to  measure  changes  in  attitudes  and  behaviour  (table  3).
Essentially attitudinal items measure the extent of changes in employee  commitment  to  the  firm
and the extent to which their objectives are aligned with those of the firm and its management.   A
significant number of employees agreed that their welfare and that of the  firm  has  become  more
closely aligned (44 percent) and that more direct relations with management are the best means  of
protecting  employee  interests  (46  percent).   Furthermore,  a   large   proportion   of   employees
disagreed  when  asked  if  there  has  been  a  reduction  in  their  level  of  loyalty  towards  either
management (44 percent) or the  firm  (54  percent).   On  the  other  hand,  a  large  proportion  of
employees also disagree when asked if they identify more with managerial objectives (43 percent)
or feel they have become more important members of the firm  (54  percent).  Overall,  taking  the
average of the six items, 41 percent of respondents agreed that there has been a positive change  in
employee attitudes,  while  36  percent  disagreed  and  23  percent  reported  no  change.   Thus  a
majority of the employees surveyed reported either no change or a negative shift.
On  the  other  hand,  reported  changes  in  respondents’  behaviour  appear   to   be   more
positive.   On  average,  the  majority  (52  percent)  of  respondents  reported  an  improvement  in
employee performance (mean for 3 items).  When asked if their willingness to go beyond assigned
duties has  deteriorated,  the  majority  (64  percent)  or  respondents  disagreed.   Furthermore,  45
percent of respondents agreed that they are more willing to put greater effort into  their  work  and
that they are more productive in their work.
The causal model proposed that the effect of  the  ESOP  on  attitudes  and  behaviour  will
depend on the ability of the ESOP to create a sense  of  employee  participation  in  firm  decision-
making and/or an effective link between employee financial wellbeing and their  performance.  To
test these relationships, table  4  shows  the  results  of  a  regression  analysis,  in  which  reported
changes in employee attitudes and behaviour are dependent variables.
To assess the impact of employee participation, we use changes in  employees’  experience
of participation at both the operational (OpPart)  and  departmental/strategic  (StratPart)  levels  as
independent variables.  To examine the financial incentive  factor,  a  dummy  variable  (ESOP)  is
used to distinguish between employees who are members of the ESOP and those who  are  not.   It
should be noted that the number of respondents who are not members  of  the  ESOP  is  relatively
small (n = 44).  Given the  significant  level  of  correlation  between  the  measures  of  change  in
operational and strategic-level participation (r = .65, see appendix 1) separate  regression  analyses
are conducted for both variables.
Table 4 Determinants of changes in employee attitudes and behaviour
|         |Standardised Beta coefficients (t-stat)                                     |
|         |Changes in employee attitudes       |   |Changes in employee behaviour      |
|         |Regression 1      |Regression 2      |Regression 3      |Regression 4      |
|Gender   |-.012 (-0.359)    |-.025 (-0.683)    |.012 (0.338)      |.004 (0.114)      |
|Retail   |.014 (0.409)      |.023 (0.592)      |.047 (1.318)      |.054 (1.382)      |
|Other    |.025 (0.791)      |.034 (0.957)      |.035 (1.038)      |.038 (1.050)      |
|ESOP     |.298 (9.075)***   |.350 (9.625)***   |.317 (9.130)***   |.373 (10.036)***  |
|OpPart   |.491 (15.611)***  |-                 |.365 (10.966)***  |-                 |
|StratPart|-                 |.293 (8.419)***   |-                 |.120 (3.363)**    |
|R²       |.400              |.254              |.298              |.185              |
|F (df)   |85.103(5,637)***  |43.322(5,635)***  |56.624 (5,668)*** |30.211(5,665)***  |
Note: *Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, ***Significant at 0.001
Regression 1 indicates that a change in employee participation at the operational  level  has
the most statistically significant impact on employee attitudes (S? = .491). Departmental/strategic-
level participation also has a significant and positive, if weaker (S? =  .293)  impact  on  employee
attitudes  (regression  2).   Therefore,  as  predicted   in   our   model,   an   increase   in   employee
participation  is   associated   with   improved   employee   attitudes   towards   the   firm   and   its
management.  This is particularly the case when employees feel they have greater say in decisions
that effect their immediate work environment.
Both Regressions 1 and 2  also  indicate  a  significant  and  positive  relationship  between
changes  in  employee  attitudes  and  ESOP  membership  (S?  =  .298  and  .350).   This  positive
relationship  indicates  that  ESOP  members  are  more  likely   to   report   an   increase   in   their
commitment  to  the  firm  and  its  management,  and  provides  support  for   the   importance   of
employee participation and financial incentives in changing employee attitudes.
Regressions 3 and 4 report the relationship between the independent variables and changes
in employee behaviour.  Results are similar  to  those  concerning  employee  attitudes,  indicating
that  operational-level  participation  is  the  most  significant  variable  in  determining   employee
behaviour (S? = .365), and ESOP membership also plays a significant role (S?  =  .317  and  .373).
Although   statistically   significant,   departmental/strategic   participation   plays   a   much    less
significant role in determining employee behaviour than employee attitudes (S? = .120).
Overall, these results support the proposition  that  the  ESOP  has  a  positive  relationship
with  attitudes  and  behaviour   through   both   the   instrumental   satisfaction   route   (employee
participation) and the extrinsic satisfaction route (financial incentives).
Conclusions
Much of the literature on employee share-ownership focuses on  the  relationship  between
ownership  and  performance  outcomes,   including   employee   attitudes   and   behaviour.    The
substantial and unparalleled size of  the  Eircom  ESOP,  presented  an  opportunity  to  conduct  a
robust test of these relationships in the context of a publicly-quoted firm.
Overall, results show a positive shift in attitudes and behaviour  since  the  introduction  of
the ESOP.  However the changes observed are  not  strong,  particularly  in  relation  to  employee
attitudes; a finding that is somewhat surprising given that the ESOP  controls  35  percent  of  firm
equity.  A number of reasons can be suggested for  this  less  than  dramatic  impact  on  employee
attitudes and behaviour.
Firstly, our survey findings indicate that the majority  of  employees  do  not  associate  the
ESOP with an increase in worker participation in decision-making.  The  representative  nature  of
the ESOP means that the day-to-day decisions are taken by the  ESOP  trust’s  board  of  directors,
who  are  appointed  by  senior  trade  union  officials,  with  little  or  no  employee   consultation.
Furthermore, although the ESOP appoints three directors to Eircom’s board, these directors have a
fiduciary  duty  to  protect  the  investment  of  all  shareholders  and  cannot  be  used  to  promote
employee welfare.  Pendleton et al (1995) highlight the importance of identifying the rationale for
establishing a ESOP when evaluating its outcomes.  The primary objective  of  the  Eircom  ESOP
was not to  promote  greater  industrial  democracy.   Instead,  it  was  established  as  a  means  of
reducing  employee  opposition  to  privatisation  and   firm   restructuring.    As   a   result,   many
employees, trade unionists and managers may  view  the  ESOP  as  primarily  a  financial  benefit
scheme, and not as a means of promoting a culture of cooperation  in  decision-making  (Rosen  et
al., 1985; Wetzel et al., 1992).
Secondly, although the financial returns  generated  by  the  ESOP  appear  to  have  had  a
significant and positive impact on employee attitudes and behaviour,  we  suggest  that  the  ESOP
has not fulfilled its potential in this respect.  Although substantial, the financial  returns  generated
by the ESOP cannot be  linked  to  changes  in  employee  performance.   Instead,  it  appears  that
increased returns have been ‘pulled along’ by reduced  firm  costs,  as  opposed  to  being  ‘pushed
along’ by the ESOP and the creation of greater employee performance (Blasi et  al.,  2003).   As  a
result, it is difficult to see how the ESOP can provide employees with a clear line of sight between
their  work-effort  and  returns  they  receive.   It  is  also  important  to  note  that   because   those
employees who leave Eircom are allowed to maintain ESOP  membership,  almost  50  percent  of
the ESOP’s participants are no  longer  employees  of  the  firm.   ESOP  participants  who  are  no
longer employed by the  firm  may  be  expected  to  have  little  interest  in  the  firm’s  long-term
prospects.
The performance of Eircom as a privatised company has proved to be highly controversial,
as the company has gone through three changes of ownership since privatisation and has  failed  to
deliver on expectations of improved service-delivery.  Ten years after full-privatisation the current
Minister for Communications asserted that “We privatised a highly  profitable,  debt-free,  heavily
investing Eircom and the result on  prices,  services,  and  broadband  has  been  disastrous”  (Irish
Times, March 18th, 2009).  The role of the ESOP in this  process  has  attracted  much  debate  and
criticism.  Sweeney (2004) concludes that the ESOP has allowed employees to gain financially  in
the short-term and has had great influence over firm governance and strategy.  However it has  not
used this influence in the long-term interests of the firm or  its  employees.   As  many  employees
have been employed by Eircom for over 25 years, they take  a  great  deal  of  pride  in  the  public
services  the  firm  provides.   For  these  employees,  the  ESOP’s  focus  on  creating   short-term
financial  returns  at  the  expense  of  long-term  service  quality  may  have  created  a   sense   of
disappointment or even resentment.
Footnotes:
1. This research has been funded by the Irish Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS).
2. A full participant will have given the firm one year of continuous service prior to the establishment of the
ESOP
3. The ESOP held Vodafone ordinary shares because of the demerger and sale of the mobile subsidiary Eircell to Vodafone
in 2001 by way of a share-swap
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Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables
Variables |M* |SD |? |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |7 | |1 Gender |- |- |- | | | | | | | | |2 Retail |- |- |- |-.26 | | | | | | | |3 Other |- |- |- |-.14 |-
.19 | | | | | | |4 ESOP |- |- |- |.11 |-.28 |-.03 | | | | | |5 OpPart |4.9 |1.3 |.85 |.05 |-.03 |-.02 |-.10 | | | | |6 StratPart |5.3 |1.4 |.90
|.07 |-.04 |-.03 |-.08 |.65 | | | |7 Attitude |4.0 |1.1 |.69 |.08 |-.09 |.02 |-.02 |.43 |.24 | | |8 Behaviour |3.6 |1.4 |.70 |.01 |.05
|.02 |.13 |.31 |.09 |.57 | |Note: N = 711, If r ?.08, p < .05; r ? .12, p < .01; r ? .14, p < .001,
*mean values are based on each measure’s original seven-point scale
------------------------------------
[1] Corresponding author for purpose of
chec?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?
[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]?[pic]ò?è?ß?ß?ß?ß?ß?Ú?ß?ß?ß?ß?ßking proofs
and requesting a copy of the research instrument.
[2] Comsource was a consortium of the privatised Dutch telecom KPN and the Swedish state-
owned telecom Telia.  It invested €232 million in Telecom Éireann, in exchange for a 20 percent
shareholding and an option to increase their stake by a further 15 percent
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